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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade there has been a notable increase in the 
literature devoted to Protestant paramilitarism in Northern Ireland. It 
has been of variable quality and sometimes distinctly parti pris. Of the 
serious academic works there would appear to be a consensus on one 
distinctive aspect of paramilitarism. Militant loyalism has been explored 
and described in terms of its ambiguity, its contradictions and its confu-
sions of aims. The governing word appears to be "uncertainty" and the 
implication is, that since the collapse of the "beautiful unity" of 
Unionism, ideologically and institutionally, the present Ulster crisis has 
brought loyalists face to face with the precarious instability of their 
whole system of values.1 Though this "beautiful unity" is a myth, it is a 
myth that exercises a powerful attraction for the Ulster Protestant. Such 
a situation is bound to provoke inconsistency if not schizophrenia. The 
simplest way to express this contradiction is to divide loyalists in 
paramilitary organizations into "politicos" and "militarists" or soft-
liners and hard-liners. This has been the general division used to 
categorize members of the Ulster Defense Association from the 
mid-1970s onwards. For instance, O'Malley in The Uncivil War defines 
his understanding of the UDA's strategic uncertainty as being rooted in 
the division "between those who think purely in paramilitary terms and 
those who want to move in a political direction."2 This is a valuable 
distinction, and a necessary one, but is not in itself sufficient to explain 
the complexity of argument within the UDA. As a tool of analysis or 
conceptual framework it is aware of division. In short, it is asking the 
right question but giving a somewhat distorted answer. A more subtle ap-
proach is necessary to ferret out a clearer perspective regarding militant 
loyalism. 
While it is evident that in terms of personality and disposition some 
members of the UDA would be more aggressive than others, the simple 
physical division or counting of heads does not get to the heart of the 
present dilemma. Arguably, the significant split is not between persons 
of choleric or pacific humor but is within the paramilitary mind itself. 
The UDA has travelled some way from the heyday of massed ranks 
loyalism in the early seventies. Its leadership has been seeking a role 
beyond mere organizational survival and the process of reflection has 
been a painful one in a community known for its inarticulateness. The 
purpose of this article is to suggest one framework within which to con-
ceptualize the alternatives faced by the UDA and the difficult uncertain-
ties posed by present circumstances. The politics of the UDA are con-
sidered within the framework of a debate between the ideas of exclusion 
and of recognition. Further, there are three appropriate levels or 
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dimensions of this political dichotomy. The first concerns relations with 
the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. The second involves the 
relationship with the British Government and the third encompasses the 
broader context of the internationalization of the Ulster problem, 
although particular emphasis is given to relations with the Republic of 
Ireland. While there are clear and obvious overlaps with the military-
political division, analysis in terms of exclusion and recognition set new 
boundaries and suggests a more complex interpénétration. The main 
weakness of the existing understanding is the implication that one "line" 
or one "side" may win out against the other. Use of the above criteria 
seems to indicate that the contradictions shown by the UDA are really 
different sides of the same coin. Literally, each is stuck with the other. 
Together, they form the reality of the political life to which Protestants 
in general have had to accommodate since 1972. 
ULSTER CATHOLICS: EXCLUSION OR RECOGNITION? 
The historic voice of militant loyalism has been unequivocally exclu-
sionist. The thrust of the cry of "No surrender" has meant no com-
promise whatever to meet demands emanating from sources outside the 
Ulster Protestant "family." It was a watchword of the majoritarian 
democracy institutionalized on the basis of a Protestant parliament for a 
Protestant people. Hence the significance of the slogan "We are the 
people!" implying a political and social non-identity for Catholics and 
the illegitimacy of the goals of Catholic politics. This was certainly not a 
"liberal" style of politics though it was understandable as a feature of 
Irish history. It was also understandable when the alternative presented 
by both Unionist and Nationalist leaders appeared to be one which was 
unacceptable to a "free" and "British" people. It was and is a position 
that excludes all distinction between the constitutional and the un-
constitutional. All activity is swept into the same category of political 
threat. It helped perpetuate the idea of separateness which the present 
crisis has only served to exacerbate — the social and political polariza-
tion of Protestant and Catholic communities. 
Conducting their survey on the problems of Northern Ireland in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s Barritt and Carter found "racial, religious, 
political, economic and social conflicts all rolled into one; ... two com-
munities which live apart, even to the extent of playing different 
games."3 In this period, however, mutual exclusion was ritualized and 
indeed stylized to such an extent that, Barritt and Carter argued, Protes-
tant and Catholic could live side by side "generally at peace." Arend Li-
jphart defined the society as "one of majority dictatorship dealing firmly 
with a minority claiming both democratic rights and a different political 
framework."4 The concept of majority is firmly embedded in a defini-
tion of Protestantism in Northern Ireland and in Ulster politics. The 
UDA inherited this concept. The campaign of the Irish Republican Army 
and the Catholic political challenge to simple majoritarianism generated 
further self-reliance and exclusionist tendencies. As Loyalist News put it: 
"Ulster is ours, not Westminster's, not Dublin's, but OURS.'" 
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Following the logic of the political mentality defined by Lijphart, 
the UDA stated early on that those responsible for violence against Pro-
testants would have the answer to the law — more precisely, to the "Ma-
jority Law." Only those Catholics who wished to remain under the ma-
jority would be welcome to stay. There was to be no idea of equality or 
of political partnership. Catholics were to be excluded from any positive 
contribution to the content of the majority law. This idea of justice is not 
a participatory, inclusive one. What is ultimately just is what is con-
ducive to the maintenance of Protestant hegemony with Catholics being 
treated justly only on sufferance.6 
The exclusion option has a paramilitary appeal because it pays 
homage to the myth that were the majority given its head then it could 
"clear out" Republican areas and return Northern Ireland to "peace." 
Such a disposition is encapsulated in the following doggerel of a Protes-
tant drinking song: 
The RC should be pressed from this part of the North 
And foolish he would be to return, 
To the land of the Prod where we will vow to God, 
His friendship of evil to spurn. 
Behind such pure bravado, the exclusionist spirit is strong though it is 
more frequently expressed in rage and frustration within the Protestant 
community than in violence against Catholics. Despite the conciliatory 
posture evident latterly, this spirit remains a sturdy bulwark of the UDA 
leadership. 
In the recent interview in the local journal Fortnight, Andy Tyrie, 
the long-serving Chairman of the UDA, took care to express his own and 
his organization's optimism with regard to a peaceful resolution of the 
present crisis. Yet it was clear that he had difficulty in distancing himself 
from the exclusionist tendency in thought and in word. Tyrie admitted 
that he saw little on which loyalists could compromise without betraying 
the very being of their community. He also sought to establish a distinc-
tion between the Catholic community as such and the Republican threats 
to Protestants and their way of life. The word "Ulster" appeared to have 
defeated him. "Ulster" can be used as inclusive of Catholics, or may 
refer to the common territory inhabited by Catholics and Protestants. 
Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the living spirit and symbol of Pro-
testant resistance to all things Catholic. Tyrie's own use of "Ulster" 
seems to be exclusionist. Commenting on recent events, he noted that, at 
present, 
...the bulk of the nationalist groups [say] there is no 
future for the Ulster Protestant community and their 
job is to destroy it. If you're talking about the warring 
groups, the groups that are involved in the war — and 
you must see the SDLP in that, and after Cardinal 
Tomas O'Fiaich's recent statement, you must see him as 
part of the war effort against the whole Protestant com-
munity — then there's a big build-up of everything 
that's opposing Ulster survival.' 
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In his statement Tyrie clearly views "Ulster" as Protestant and at 
war with any and every Catholic and Catholic institution. It is not a mat-
ter of semantics but a matter of political realities. Yet, he retreats quickly 
into vagueness and equivocation. His choice to be less than clear on most 
other points is perhaps understandable. As a spokesman frequently 
quoted in the media, Tyrie, of necessity, is sensitive to the conflicts 
within his own organization. The UDA has chosen to respond to the 
growing opposition to Ulster's survival in more than words. It claims to 
be in the process of developing an Ulster Defence Force from within its 
ranks in preparation for a "doomsday situation.'" 
The notion of the Ulster Defence Force is neither a totally sinister 
nor exclusionist one. Rather, it can be contended that, at present, the 
currents within the UDA actually make it impossible to establish ab-
solute exclusionism at the top level. The proposal for the UDF is fraught 
with qualifications concerning the need for a political approach as well as 
military preparations. It is the use of language again that tends to betray 
the confusion or uncertainty in the minds of the leadership over the pur-
pose of political and military activity. Political activity suggests com-
promise, cooperation and recognition. However, the UDA document on 
reorganization speaks of losing ground and of combatting the forces 
which would "oppose the development of a strong Ulster Protestant 
society."10 Such phraseology leads one to believe, first, that the UDA 
wants to void whatever positive gains Catholics have made since 1969, 
and second, that the idea of a strong Ulster Protestant society by defini-
tion should totally exclude Catholics from political influence. If this is 
not the intention of the UDA, more care and precision is needed in its 
statements. If such statements can be taken at face value, then the UDF 
may be a device to give expression (whether simply on paper or in men 
with arms remains to be seen) to the exclusionist tendency while the 
"war" is pursued by other means. If massed ranks loyalism is a thing of 
the past, then elite corps loyalism may be the next best thing. Cir-
cumstances often dictate policy and organization. In this case, though, 
the circumstances come not only from external exigencies but also from 
internal debate. 
The other voice in this internal debate appeals less to emotion or ag-
gression and more to political reason. The trauma of the troubles and the 
intractability of "zero-sum partisanship" (exclusion) has led elements of 
the UDA to accept, perhaps reluctantly, the emptiness and negativity of 
the old simplicities. There has emerged, in a limited fashion, an 
understanding of the common experience of Protestant and Catholic, in-
deed, that the very definition of Protestantism itself is closely bound up 
with Ulster Catholicism. Or, to paraphrase that mysterious Hegelian 
phrase, the common identity of identity and non-identity. The idea of ex-
clusion sees this relationship purely in terms of master and slave. The 
concept of recognition embodied in some of the arguments and ideas of 
the UDA leadership is a disposition to view the relationship as one of 
equality in adversity. Recognition was a political theory expressed clearly 
in the New Ulster Political Research Group's (the original political wing 
of the UDA) document Beyond The Religious Divide. Published in 1979, 
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it represented a distillation of some years of debate and reflection and it 
argued for an independent Ulster as a "no-loss" outcome for both com-
munities." 
Under the inspiration of Glen Barr, the NUPRG proposed a form of 
political identity that recognized the rights of both communities but at-
tempted to overcome the conflicting national aspirations of Protestant 
British and Catholic Irish. It would be an identity-in-difference. The 
common experience of sectarian strife, it was argued or implied, had 
forged a certain respect for each community's uniqueness and that this 
was the basis upon which commonly acceptable institutions could be 
built — on an Ulster basis alone. There would be a classic constitutional 
trade-off: Protestants would sever the British link and Catholics would 
sever their allegiance to a United Ireland. Both would admit the im-
possibility of domination, but would recognize that between themselves 
they could build a harmonious society. Difference would contribute to 
political stability rather than destroying it. As far as the NUPRG was 
concerned, these proposals were the best way to return Ulster to "proper 
politics," which meant not an exclusionist struggle but a recognition of 
genuine issues of socio-economic importance. The language of Beyond 
The Religious Divide is forthright, concluding that it is not designed to 
achieve "the creation of a Protestant dominated State, nor is it the stepp-
ing stone to a United Ireland." It does, however, provide "an opportuni-
ty for peace and stability. It is an opportunity for the Ulster people to get 
back their dignity."12 Clearly "Ulster people" meant something very dif-
ferent here than the exclusive term traditionally used. 
The transformation of the NUPRG into the Ulster Loyalist 
Democratic Party and the change in political spokesmen from Barr to 
John McMichael has not altered the open advocacy of independence. 
However, since the Hunger Strike of 1981 and the subsequent political 
successes of Provisional Strike of 1981 and the subsequent political suc-
cesses of Provisional Sinn Fein (the political wing of the IRA) there has 
been a distinct change in the substance and spirit of the message. As far 
as formal policy documents are concerned, the ULDP appears to have 
carried the NUPRG's standard forward. In the statements "Peace With 
Dignity" and "The Way Ahead," it was clearly argued that recognition 
and involvement of both communities in Ulster's political process is a 
prerequisite of any way forward. Democracy must triumph, and "the 
imposition of partisan values, creeds and philosophies should be replac-
ed by the accepted recognition that we are a pluralist society." Though 
two distinct traditions are involved, the ULDP's desire and aim is to 
establish constructive co-existence.13 This is the benign model of political 
activity generally embraced by McMichael in public. Putting his case to 
Padraig O'Malley, McMichael was clear that no political party in Nor-
thern Ireland should endeavor to create a monolith (thus placing the 
blame with the old Protestant identity of the Unionist Party). Further, he 
acknowledged that there could never be any recognized settlement "if 
you have circumstances where there is one majority and one minority."14 
These are views to which Tyrie would also subscribe, without in the least 
feeling he had contradicted his previously cited opinions. 
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Since the Hunger Strikes of 1981, which proved such a propaganda 
and political success for the Provisional IRA, there has developed a 
sharper edge to this message of conciliation. The recognitionists openly 
condemn indiscriminate shootings of Catholics. This is no longer accep-
table as necessary policy. But, whereas the Barr strategy was one of 
open-handed peaceful intent at a time when sectarian tensions were low, 
such a course cannot be universally accepted within the UDA while the 
Provisional campaign, political and military, continues. Between 
Catholicism and violent Republicanism a distinction must be made if the 
idea of recognition is to hold any ground as a political force in the 
organization. The elements of IRA terror have to be isolated and 
destroyed. They are legitimate targets for UDA "Soldiers" so long as the 
forces of the state are incapable of dealing with the enemies of Ulster. 
Both Tyrie and McMichael are quite plain about this. While the UDA 
ought not to "come into conflict with the Catholic community" the cam-
paign against the IRA and INLA "cannot be shelved," serving as it does 
as an "ongoing crusade" through which "only the guilty suffer." To the 
UDA, "That's the way any war should be fought."15 
Despite their political commitment to recognition, the 
UDLP/UDA's idea of what is to be recognized remains selective. 
Recognition is only on the basis of an Ulster community, not on the basis 
of an Irish Republic. Voting for Sinn Fein is seen as illegitimate, an ex-
pression of non-recognition of Protestantism, and it takes two to make 
recognition meaningful. The weakness of the recognitionist position 
within the UDA, its dependence on circumstances beyond its control, are 
summed up in McMichaeFs classically coded message after the Provi-
sional Sinn Fein garnered ten percent of the vote in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly elections of October 1982: 
Where does this situation leave Ulster Protestants? If we 
are to survive must we adopt a simple "us-or-them" at-
titude and fight for what we want? And if we do, will we 
again be branded as small-minded bigots? What have 
we got to lose?16 
That he left all these questions in their simple rhetorical form is an in-
dication of the mental struggle between exclusion and recognition. 
The uncertainty of the UDA's present attitude towards Ulster 
Catholics has led some commentators to question their political sincerity. 
For instance, O'Malley gives the distinct impression that he believes that 
it is a cleverly calculated maneuver. The UDA leadership may contain 
political amateurs, may stumble about in the fog of its rhetoric, but it has 
given itself a good cover, a mantle of earnest good intentions. Through 
this, O'Malley contends that it has gained "a measure of respectability 
which pays a handsome dividend: its past transgressions, if not forgot-
ten, are for the most part largely forgiven: and its current lapses, if not 
forgiven, are for the most part largely excused."17 That the UDA is now 
a different creature only reluctantly provoked into action and retaliation 
is, says O'Malley, "a conclusion the UDA itself carefully cultivates." 
This is perhaps too harsh and cynical a judgement. Certainly good 
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intentions are never enough, but at least there has been some attempt at 
political movement. That circumstances have not been favorable is not 
entirely of the UDA's making. It has no independent control over its 
resolution and, when even small steps can lead to disaster, it is unrealistic 
to expect too much soon. 
RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 
Relations with the British Government present the same degree of 
complexity, the ironies and subtleties of which have been explored 
historically by David Miller in his book Queen's Rebels. The UDA ex-
hibits the modern configuration of the same complexity, and in its 
deliberations and posturings encapsulates the tension between 
Britishness and Ulster Protestantism. While both are features of the 
same identity, they may call forth conflicting loyalties to the sovereign 
political authority on the one hand and to communal loyalty on the 
other. In the flux of the present crisis, they also involve a conceptual, 
ideological struggle between exclusion and recognition. Indeed in this 
case the two are even more confusingly intertwined and convoluted. 
There appear to be two significant aspects to recognition by the British 
Government that motivate the UDA. First, there is a negative factor, the 
recognition that the UDA is able, by massed-ranks loyalism, to exercise 
an effective veto over the plans of any administration in London. It is a 
possibility that must be constantly restated, otherwise it may not be 
believed and it gains force by being kept in the public mind. Second, 
there is a positive aspect which claims for the UDA the right to some sort 
of involvement in mapping out the constitutional future of Ulster. It is a 
claim to be taken seriously, particularly as a political force with ideas to 
contribute to the current debate. Similarly, exclusion has two aspects. 
The UDA may be ignored altogether as a political or military force and 
not be accorded any hearing by those in authority. It could also be bann-
ed altogether as an organization. 
The negative dimension of recognition has been the UDA's 
historical experience. The price of Ulster's integrity is held to be eternal 
vigilance and a refusal to go along with the honeyed words from 
Westminster. With the fall of the Stormont administration, the inception 
of direct rule and then, later, with the establishment of the power-sharing 
Executive as an instrument of British policy, militant loyalists felt that 
their normal channels of communication (the Stormont "system") had 
been bypassed to facilitate a "sell-out" to the Irish Republic. The loyalist 
response, the Ulster Worker's Council strike of 1974, was what A.O. 
Hirschman would have termed a "boycott," that is "a weapon of 
customers who do not have, at least at the time of the boycott, an alter-
native."" Hirschman's economic analysis is rather an appropriate 
description of the political circumstances encountered by the UDA in 
1974. Its action was a classic one of political negativity for there was no 
consensus within the Protestant community regarding an alternative. No 
one was prepared to seize the moment of governmental paralysis to im-
pose one, not least the UDA. 
Thus the UDA had proved that an effective "boycott" could 
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prevent solutions from being imposed by the British Government 
without the whole-hearted consent of Ulster Protestants and in a fashion 
that upstaged the rhetoric of Unionist politicians. It also served to show 
that, in the face of Westminster priorities, militant loyalists could not en-
force their own solutions. As the failure of the subsequent 1977 strike 
showed, boycott without effective alternatives is subject to diminishing 
returns. Its over-employment may fragment that Protestant unity it is 
designed to foster. Therefore the present circumstances of the Ulster 
crisis place severe limitations on the purely negative power of loyalist 
paramilitarism. In the words of David Miller, it is useful as a means to 
"keep Britain up to the mark in honouring her imputed obligations," or, 
in other words, to recognize her duty to defend and protect Ulster from 
all Republican threats in order to maintain the Protestant identity." The 
fact that the British Government certainly recognizes a duty to Northern 
Ireland does not mean that it recognizes it in the manner posed by the 
UDA. British perspectives are not those of the militant loyalist no matter 
how strong the professions of fidelity on both sides. Thus the negative 
idea of recognition, while a powerful one, was seen to be ultimately un-
dignified by sections of the UDA leadership. The need for an alternative, 
to avoid the Hirschman dilemma and to get beyond the sterility of 
boycott, helped to stimulate thinking on the idea of Ulster independence. 
Here was an historical claim for a positive contribution and a recognition 
by British politicians that the UDA was not just the strong arm of local 
politicians but a legitimate party to discussions in its own right. 
The central thrust behind the proposals for a negotiated in-
dependence for Northern Ireland has already been mentioned. The ques-
tion remains regarding how far this was recognized as legitimate by the 
British Government. For here was a curious phenomenon, a loyalist 
organization, whose roots lay deep in the sacrifices of Ulster troops in 
both world wars for Empire, Queen and Country, whose Protestant 
community is suffused with all the symbolism of Britishness, being 
prepared to put forward as a first option breaking the link with Great 
Britain. In other words, on principle, the UDA was proposing to exclude 
the British Government from the affairs of Northern Ireland, internally 
if not externally. As a recent policy document argues, the outcome, 
though not the intention of a "London based government for Northern 
Ireland is by nature a repressive one." Even if this is the result of ig-
norance and not malice, it is time for "self-determination."20 
The British Government's response has been, understandably, 
equivocal. While it professes to be open to all political suggestions for a 
way forward in Northern Ireland, obviously there are certain options 
that any Government will not accept for both domestic and international 
reasons. The pattern of British policy has been to encourage the UDA in 
its political activities, to keep it talking, and, thus, to keep it off the 
streets. Leaders like Tyrie and McMichael have been transformed from 
representatives of the sinister, hooded "thugs" to quasi-respectable 
political spokesmen. They both make good journalistic copy. Since the 
late 1970s the leadership has coveted the kudos of formal and informal 
links with the Northern Ireland Office. There is a nice irony in this. 
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Many UDA statements have attacked the middle class Unionist leader-
ship for their historic role of "duping" the Protestant working class, of 
embroiling them in "border" politics rather than "proper politics." 
Now the paramilitaries' own working class leaders are, in fact, doing 
what the Unionist leadership did in the 1920s — acting as a disciplining 
and restraining influence to attain their own political goals. 
However, the NIO has never given any visible credence to the in-
dependence option either because it fears that it would lead to Protestant 
hegemony or because it fears the diplomatic response of the Republic of 
Ireland, or both. For instance, the constitutional talks initiated in 1980 
by Humphrey Atkins, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
specifically excluded independence from the constitutional agenda. It 
was not recognized as an option at all. Similarly, it has never appeared 
on any subsequent governmental agenda. Indeed, since the creation of 
the Assembly in 1982 on the initiative of the present Secretary of State, 
James Prior, the UDA's aggressively independent tones have been 
muted. Since neither of the political parties representing Catholics — the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and PSF — participate in 
the Assembly, it has, in practice, become a Protestant Parliament for a 
Protestant People. It could well be that many in the UDA are happy with 
this despite all the fine words about accommodation with the "other 
side." It could also be that the existence of the Assembly is held to be a 
step in the right direction, not only towards greater local control but 
also, eventually, to independence. In this way, at least, the UDA might 
feel "passively" involved in political deliberations about a new Northern 
Ireland.21 
The UDA is the largest paramilitary organization in Northern 
Ireland and the only one not proscribed under Schedule 2 of the 
Emergency Provisions Act. Exclusion through proscription has always 
hung over its head. Calls for proscription have been frequent and tend to 
follow terrorist incidents where known UDA members have been involv-
ed or implicated. The fact that most of these members have been con-
victed under a nom de guerre such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters has not 
fooled anyone. However, it is clear that it is neither in the interest of the 
Government nor the UDA for the Association to be proscribed. An 
open, legal UDA is also open to penetration by security forces. A legal 
UDA allows the organization to continue its lucrative business opera-
tions — taxis, social clubs, bars — from which members and loyalist 
prisoners profit. When Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Hum-
phrey Atkins, declared that the "test of proscription is whether an 
organization is actively supporting, encouraging or engaged in terrorist 
activities,"22 it was obvious the Government diplomatically deemed the 
UDA to be innocent of such charges. To exclude the UDA might only 
drive it underground to something worse. Better to have it above ground 
where the threat of proscription will act as a further agent of political 
discipline, even though UDA leaders may claim to ignore such threats. 
As an established element in Ulster Protestant life, the UDA as an 
organization has too much to lose by rash behavior. Since 1974, the 
British Government too has become more sensitive in its management of 
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opinion. Both appear to recognize the limits of the possible and have 
tacitly agreed to play within the "rules." 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Ulster Protestantism in general, and militant loyalism in particular, 
has traditionally been noted for its inarticulateness and self-reliance. It 
has usually spoken and acted in terms of the integrity of the Ulster pro-
blem and savagely denounced all outside interference. This being so, it 
has never really made much effort to justify its cause, preferring to rely 
upon God and the strength of the community. However, the modern in-
ternationalization of the Ulster problem by mainstream political na-
tionalists and extreme Republicans has forced a reconsideration of Pro-
testant insularity. There has been an increasing tendency to modify ex-
clusion by a recognition of the importance of outside links and the need 
to engage forthrightly in the battle of ideas. This development is slow, 
hesitant and fitful yet increasingly salient. Two examples illustrate this 
new concern of the UDA. 
It is no longer possible to ignore the international successes of the 
IRA's propaganda war, even though Protestants would tend to be united 
regarding the illegitimacy of any external involvement, verbal or material 
(except, of course, support for Protestantism). For instance, statements 
on Ulster by American Presidential candidates are received with hostility 
as are any actions deemed to lend support to the ideal of Republicanism. 
However, the UDA recognizes that any counterpropaganda is difficult to 
formulate. As Tyrie argues, Ulster has become established as a colonial 
problem and the IRA as an anti-colonial freedom force.23 The UDA has 
not the resources to combat such a world view. Nevertheless, it has 
recognized the need to manufacture a counter-myth that may be of some 
future use. It has thus commissioned historical research by local author 
Ian Adamson into the curious, mysterious origins and development of 
the "Cruthin." The Cruthin are claimed to be the "original" Ulster tribe 
that colonized Scotland and the north-east of Ireland before the Celts. 
The return of the Protestant Scottish settlers during the Plantation of 
Ulster in the seventeenth century and the driving out of the Catholic 
Celts (the struggle of Planter and Gael) is viewed therefore as repatria-
tion, not an occupation. Indeed, this is quite a reversal of historical 
perspective, and it establishes, so the UDA contends, the inalienable and 
unshakable right of Ulster Protestants to retain their true "homeland." 
Although most Ulster Protestants feel no need for this historical inter-
pretation, at least it provides a useful counterpoint to the Republican in-
terpretation of history." 
The important international perspective is more tangible and closer 
to home. It concerns relations with the Republic of Ireland. Exclusionist 
feeling is undoubtedly the most powerful of emotions and deeply rooted 
in communal experience. O'Malley provides an expression of this feeling 
in the UDA's journal Ulster, claiming "Southern Ireland is a foreign 
state with whom we can find nothing of importance in common. Our 
heritage, history and culture are separate and different."25 Indeed, none 
of the political parties receiving substantial support from within the 
49 
Winter 1985 
Protestant electorate, not even the bi-confessional Alliance Party, can 
accept any positive role for the Irish Republic in Ulster affairs, except in 
the suppression of terrorism on its own side of the border. The main dif-
ference is simply that the UDA is usually prepared to use stronger 
language in its condemnation. 
Recently the UDA political wing has been more concerned with 
stressing recognition as the positive dimension to the Protestant case. In 
the document "The Way Ahead" an open-handed, softer line is taken. It 
recognizes two distinct traditions in the island of Ireland and indicates 
the UDA wishes "to co-exist in peace, harmony and in mutual respect." 
This is much more conciliatory than the denunciations of misty, 
historical Celtic twilights. Significantly, "The Way Ahead" argues that 
the ULDP needs help and advice, and that the leadership would welcome 
not only the advice of the British Government but of the Irish as well, 
always provided that such aid is "motivated by the desire to encourage 
reconciliation of Ulster People" and not "self-interest or imperialist 
design."" Such pronouncements have been welcomed by the Irish 
Government in Dublin. On occasion party and government leaders from 
the Republic have engaged in dialogue with the UDA. It is clear, 
however, that the perspective is different on both sides. For the Dublin 
Government, the aim is to build support for some kind of eventual Irish 
unity and the recognition of the legitimacy of that ideal. For the UDA, 
recognition of a separate Ulster identity legitimately having its own 
political institutions is the goal about which there can be no compromise. 
Yet, even such a predictable view of the Irish Republic is difficult to 
sell to the UDA rank and file. Just the acceptance of a Dublin Govern-
ment showing concern over Northern Ireland goes deeply against the 
grain of militant loyalism. Dublin is the "enemy without." McMichael 
had been working on a submission for the Dublin sponsored New Ireland 
Forum which had invited proposals from all concerned parties regarding 
Ireland's constitutional development. He admitted that in the wake of 
the Darkley murders and the assassination of Unionist Assemblyman 
Edgar Graham it had been impossible to go forward. To recognize that 
the proceedings in Dublin had any significance for loyal Ulster people in 
such circumstances would have "split the movement."27 While some 
may deem it a necessity of life, a part of Realpolitik, to recognize that the 
Republic must at least be involved in the ratification of an Ulster "solu-
tion," most do not. Lloyd George was perceptive in his view that 
borders, once made on a map, become indelible in the minds of an in-
secure people. The border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland has for too long been the symbol of Protestant fidelity. It is felt 
to be the cordon sanitaire for a distinctive way of life. As such, exclusion 
must remain the main disposition of militant loyalists towards the Dublin 
Government. 
CONCLUSION 
It is not the purpose of this paper to suggest some transcendental 
synthesis between these two poles of paramilitary thinking. To play 
around with such concepts as "exclusive recognition" or "recognized 
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exclusion" would really not fill any need and would be mere academic 
posturing. It is hard to imagine to what they might apply, although the 
UDA leadership might find either an "exclusive recognition" of loyalism 
by Britain or a "recognized exclusion" of an independent Northern 
Ireland from interference by the Irish Republic a congenial conclusion. 
Nor indeed would any simplistic moralization be appropriate. That may 
be left up to archbishops. The wide gulf between exclusion and recogni-
tion, the extreme difficulty of compromise, illustrate the clear intrac-
tability of the Northern Ireland "problem." As interviews with the UDA 
leaders show, both conceptions can exist consciously or unconsciously 
within the same argument. 
It would be unfair to attribute such schizophrenia to the UDA 
leadership alone. It exists in every Protestant consciousness and every 
Catholic consciousness in Ulster's divided society. At least Tyrie and 
McMichael, whatever their shortcomings, conduct their mental wrestling 
in public. As Michael Oakeshott once wrote somewhere, men sometimes 
unexpectedly achieve great things in the fog of the unknown and uncer-
tain. Perhaps in the struggle with the uncertainty of their own priorities, 
the UDA may achieve something worthwhile, a positive contribution to 
the politics of conflict resolution. To which one may add, but, on the 
other hand .... 
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Author's Note 
* The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments made on this paper by 
Philip Boskett. 
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